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Abstract—In recent years, there has been a rising concern
about the policy of major search engines, and more speciﬁcally
about their ranking in so-called organic results corresponding
to keywords searches. The associated proposition is that their
behavior should be regulated. The concern comes from search
bias, which refers to search rankings based on some principle
different from the expected automated relevance. In this paper,
we analyze one behavior that results in search bias: the payment
by content providers to the search engine in order to improve
the chances to be located and accessed by a search engine user.
A simple game theory-based model is presented where both
a search engine and a content provider interact strategically,
and the aggregated behavior of users is modeled by a demand
function. The utility of each stakeholder when the search engine
is engaged in such a non-neutral behavior is compared with the
neutral case when no such side payment is present.
Index Terms—Search engine, neutrality, Nash equilibrium,
user welfare
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an increasing concern about
Google policy, in terms of its search activities, implying the
eventuality that this role should be regulated by government
authorities. This is the aim of “search engine neutrality”
advocates. The concern is about search engine bias, a term
used to describe the activities of a search engine exercising
its editorial discretion in a manner that advantages its own
or afﬁliated content, which could favor some content wishing
to pay to be better ranked, or which could disadvantage
rivals. Search bias therefore refers to rankings based on some
principle other than automated relevance for users. Within this
paper, we focus on this concern shown by some regulators
on those search rankings that beneﬁt the host search engine:
for example the European Commission justiﬁes its inquiry
into Google by a need to investigate if there is a conduct
potentially “lowering the ranking of unpaid results” relatively
to paid advertisements even in the regular, also called organic,
results, as opposed to the sponsored links clearly declared (and
presented as such to users) to make money [1].
Search neutrality advocates need, however, to demonstrate
that there is a problem necessitating any of the various pre-
scribed remedies, such as the application of standard merger
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analysis under the antitrust laws and even the creation of a
government-sponsored “public option” for searches [2].
Problems cited by search neutrality advocates may be
broadly classiﬁed in two groups: competition law and antitrust
problems arising from “non-objective” search results, and
social and cultural issues arising from the use that consumers
may make with “non-objective” results. This paper is focused
on the former group.
As regards the potential competitive harm from search bias,
one argument is based on the “essential facilities” doctrine [3]
and stresses that popular search engines, Google for instance
, act as a “bottleneck” to access of websites to consumers.
By using its power to determine which end websites are
reached or not, a search engine can effectively exclude nascent
websites from both advertising and sales revenue. Another,
but related, argument claims that Google disadvantages its
content rivals by raising their (awareness) costs relatively to
its own. By directing search trafﬁc to its own products —
e.g., its mail, calendar, and marketplace platforms— Google
would effectively discriminate against rivals and forces those
rivals into more expensive substitute distributions channels [4].
The question remains whether a search engine’s use of its
search algorithm to direct trafﬁc to itself harms competition
and consumers [5].
This paper aims to shed light on the issue of the search
bias. Speciﬁcally, it focuses on the analysis of the harm
that an apparently non-neutral behavior by a search engine
may have on content providers and users. The non-neutral
behavior we speciﬁcally consider here consists in charging a
side payment to the content providers in exchange for better
search results. While the issue of network neutrality, that is,
the question whether all packets should be treated equally or
not, has recently been the topic of a very active debate and
extensive literature (see references [6], [7]), this paper is to our
knowledge the ﬁrst one dealing with a mathematical modeling
and analysis of search neutrality, though this issue may be
critical as we have just highlighted above.
The paper is a result of the project INNIS1. The project is
run under the umbrella of the EuroNF Network of Excellence,
which is ﬁnanced through the FP7 program of the European
Union.
1Visit the project webpage at http://www.irisa.fr/dionysos/pages perso/
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Fig. 1. General model
The paper is structured as follows. The next section de-
scribes the scenario to be modeled and presents the details of
the baseline (neutral) model, which comprises a search engine
without a search bias, and analyzes the corresponding pricing
optimization problem of a pay-per-use content provider. Sec-
tion III models the case where the search engine exhibits a
search bias, and computes the related equilibrium of the non-
cooperative game played with the content provider. Section IV
compares the outputs obtained in both cases, neutral and non-
neutral. And ﬁnally, some conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. GENERAL MODEL, AND ANALYSIS OF THE NEUTRAL
CASE
The scenario modeled in this paper is shown in Fig. 1. It
includes:
• The users, who typically access the content stored at the
content provider by using the search engine services by
means of keywords.
• One content provider (CP), which provides paid content
to the users, at a price p.
• The search engine (SE), which helps the users in locating
the content at the content provider, and in the non-neutral
case charges a price q to the CP.
Arrows represent money ﬂows, and are labeled by the corre-
sponding unit price.
In this section, we model the case where there is no side
payment from the CP to the SE, that is, where q = 0 in
Fig. 1. We take this case as the baseline model, so that the
search engine non-neutral behavior will be compared with this
benchmark/baseline model.
A. Users
We model the users by means of a demand function D(p)
representing the total amount of users subscribing to the CP,
where p is the ﬂat-rate price charged by the content provider.
D is assumed linearly decreasing in p, i.e.,
D(p) = β0(D0 − d · p), (1)
where d > 0 is a parameter representing the sensitivity of users
to the price p, and β0 denotes the probability (0 < β0 < 1)
that the content is located by the search engine and therefore
accessed by a user. D0 is the maximum potential level of
demand, if the content was for free, and provided it is fully
advertised by the search engine. D0 − dp can be interpreted
as (being proportional to) the probability that a user, given
the fact that he has “found” the content, actually subscribes
to its service. That decision depends on the price p set by the
content provider, but also on the user’s willingness-to-pay for
the service.
B. Content provider
We assume as described in Fig. 1 that the CP charges a
ﬁxed price p to the users. In the baseline model the CP is
assumed not to incur costs, so that the CP’s proﬁts are given
by:
Πc = D · p. (2)
Again, we also assume that every piece of content that the
users would like to access is stored by the content provider.
However, the content will be located by the users by using the
service of the search engine, which means that there is content
stored at the CP which may end up not being accessed by the
users if the search engine denies mentioning it.
C. Search engine
The role of the SE is to “help” users reach the content that
is relevant to them.
We assume in our baseline model that the SE does not
charge any usage-based price to the CPs. However, there is an
additional revenue coming from sponsored links (displayed
usually at the top and/or at the right of the regular/organic
links), and which can reasonably be assumed to be propor-
tional to the demand level. Indeed, users subscribing to the
CP can be seen from the SE point of view as “satisﬁed” by
the SE results, hence more likely to use that SE again and
yield revenues through the sponsored links. Thus,
ΠSE = λ ·D (3)
with λ > 0 the coefﬁcient giving the revenue per subscriber to
the CP service, coming from sponsored links. Therefore in the
baseline model more demand at the CP level will give more
revenue to the SE.
D. Solution
Given that the parameters D0, β0, d and λ are ﬁxed, the
only decision variable in this baseline model is the CP price
p. The CP will charge a price p so as to maximize its proﬁts
Πc. It is straightforward to see that this maximum is reached
when the ﬁrst order condition (FOC)
∂Πc
∂p
= 0 (4)
is fulﬁlled, giving
p(n) =
D0
2d
. (5)
This then gives:
D(n) =β0
D0
2
(6)
Π(n)c =β0
D20
4d
(7)
Π
(n)
SE =λβ0
D0
2
. (8)
III. NON-NEUTRAL MODEL
The neutral case being solved, we now focus on the non-
neutral behavior of a SE implementing a side payment q from
the CP to the SE. The effect of the side payment is two-fold:
• Paying q to the SE will increase the chances that the
content is located and accessed by the users, when users
decide to use the SE. We model this effect through an
increasing function β1(q).
• The more the SE charges to the CP, the less the users trust
the search results because the search bias will increase
and the reputation of the SE will decrease, and the less
likely they will use the SE. We model this reputation
effect through a decreasing function β2(q).
As a consequence, the overall probability β0 that the CP is
seen by a user in the baseline model can be replaced here by
a probability
β(q) = β1(q)β2(q), (9)
taking into account both positive and negative consequences
of side payments.
We will also assume
β(0) = β0 (10)
so that the CP not paying any charge to the SE will reasonably
be such that the model comes down to the baseline/neutral
case. In the non-neutral case though, the SE could play with
β1 to impose β(0) < β0 to enforce the CP to pay. This (other)
case is left for further research; but does not add any major
change to the analysis.
Taking into account this side payment, the demand function
D and the proﬁts Πc and ΠSE are now given by:
D(p, q) =β(q)(D0 − d · p) (11)
Πc =D · (p− q) (12)
ΠSE =Dq + λD. (13)
A. General solution
In the non-neutral model, given β(·) and parameters D0,
d, and λ, the CP and the SE interact strategically and non-
cooperatively in order to maximize their respective proﬁts.
That is, the CP will charge a price p so as to maximize its proﬁt
Πc, and simultaneously the SE will charge a side payment q
so as to maximize its proﬁts ΠSE . The analysis framework is
that of non-cooperative game theory [8], and the equilibrium
concept that of Nash equilibrium, which is a strategy proﬁle
(p∗, q∗) such that no player (the CP or the SE) can unilaterally
increase its proﬁts through a price change.
Given the strategy q of the SE, the FOC for the CP is now:
∂Πc
∂p
= β(q)(D0 − 2dp+ dq) = 0 (14)
which, assuming β(q) = 0, yields
p(nn) = D0/2d+ q/2. (15)
And for the SE, differentiating with respect to q and
equating to zero, we get
∂ΠSE
∂q
= (D0 − dp)
(
(q + λ)
∂β(q)
∂q
+ β(q) · 1
)
= 0 (16)
where we assume that (D0 − dp) > 0 (otherwise the SE gets
nothing). As a consequence, the derivative is of the same sign
as β(q) + ∂β∂q (q + λ). But remark that if
β(q) +
∂β
∂q
(q + λ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
> 0 if 0 < q < q∗,
0 if q = q∗,
< 0 if q > q∗,
(17)
then the value q∗ (provided the corresponding value p(nn) in
(15) leads to a positive demand) maximizes ΠSE(q). This is
assumed from now on.
Additionally, the equilibrium q∗ > 0 should lead to a better
performance, in terms of probability for the CP to be visited,
with respect to the neutral case, so that the non-neutral service
is an enhanced service for the CP. That is,
β(q∗) ≥ β(0). (18)
B. Particular solution
We consider, in order to make some numerical computa-
tions, the following expressions for β1(q) and β2(q):
β1(q) =
(
1− 1− β0
q + 1
)
(19)
β2(q) =
1
q + 1
. (20)
Note that the condition in (10) is satisﬁed. Remark that the
constraint β(q∗) > β(0) and the fact that β1(q)β2(q) is
decreasing when q > 1− 2β0 implies that β0 < 1/2.
Substituting (19) and (20) in (16), we get
q∗ =
β0 + λ(1− 2β0)
λ− 2 + β0 . (21)
Requirement (18) becomes
β(q∗) =
(λ− 2 + β0)(λ− λβ0 − β0 + β20)
4(λ+ β0 − λβ0 − 1)2
=
(λ− 2 + β0)(λ− β0)
4(1− β0)(λ− 1)2 > β0
After some algebra and bearing in mind that β0 < 1/2, the
above inequality can be rewritten as
λ2 − 2λ− β0(2− 3β0)
(1− 2β0)2 > 0 .
which is satisﬁed if and only if
λ > 1 +
√
1 +
β0(2− 3β0)
(1− 2β0)2 = 2 +
β0
1− 2β0 . (22)
Having justiﬁed that this β(q) complies with the required
properties, from (21) and (15), the following values can be
obtained:
D(nn) =β(q∗)(D0 − d · p(nn)) (23)
Π(nn)c =D · (p(nn) − q∗) (24)
Π
(nn)
SE =Dq
∗ + λD. (25)
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NEUTRAL AND
NON-NEUTRAL CASES
In this section, the output for the users, the CP and the SE in
the non-neutral case is compared with the baseline case, and
constraints on the values of the parameters providing better
output thanks to non-neutrality are derived.
A. Demand and proﬁts
We ﬁrst focus on the users demand D, the CP proﬁt Πc,
and the SE proﬁt ΠSE .
As a ﬁrst approximation, note that p(nn) = D0/2d+ q/2 ≥
D0/2d = p
(n). Thus, the price paid by users in the non-
neutral case is higher that in the neutral case. However, the
performance of the search engine increases at q∗ with respect
to the situation at q = 0, so that it may happen that this effect
dominates and the demand increases.
To simplify notation in the sequel we write β∗ instead of
β(q∗). We assume that (18) is satisﬁed, then β0/β∗ < 1. Deal-
ing with (6)–(8) and with (23)–(25), the following conditions
are obtained:
D(nn) > D(n) iff C1 ≡ D0
d
>
q∗
1− β0β∗
, (26)
Π(nn)c > Π
(n)
c iff C2 ≡
D0
d
>
q∗
1−
√
β0
β∗
, (27)
Π
(nn)
SE > Π
(n)
SE iff C3 ≡
D0
d
>
q∗
1− λλ+q∗ β0β∗
. (28)
Comparing C1 and C3 (or directly (3) and (13)) it is easily
seen that if D(nn) > D(n) then necessarily Π(nn)SE > Π
(n)
SE .
Similarly, if Π(nn)c > Π
(n)
c then D(nn) > D(n). In summary,
we have that
Π(nn)c > Π
(n)
c ⇒ D(nn) > D(n) ⇒ Π(nn)SE > Π(n)SE . (29)
Hence, the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for both proﬁts
being higher in the non-neutral scenario is C2.
On the minimum value of λ: In the following paragraphs,
we derive the restrictions that C2 imposes on λ.
Note that the right-hand side of the inequality in C2 is
decreasing in λ. This follows from the two facts:
• β∗ is increasing in λ
β∗ =
(λ− 2 + β0)(λ− β0)
4(1− β0)(λ− 1)2
=
1
4(1− β0)
(
1− (1− β0)
2
(λ− 1)2
)
.
• q∗ is decreasing in λ
∂q∗
∂λ
=
−2(1− β0)2
(λ− 2 + β0)2 < 0 .
Therefore, for a given value of D0/d, condition C2 is
equivalent to imposing a minimum value for λ. Furthermore,
the lower D0/d is, the higher that minimum value will be.
Conversely, for a given λ, C2 gives a lower bound for D0/d,
and the higher λ is, the less restrictive that lower bound is.
B. User welfare
Another output of the equilibrium to compare is the user
welfare representing the aggregated value that users get from
the whole service.
One expression for the user welfare can be obtained from
the demand function D(p, q) = β(q)(D0 − dp).
We have assumed that users differ not only with respect to
their search behavior—modeled through a distribution on the
SE choices and on the click behavior on search results over
the user population, but also with respect to their willingness-
to-pay—modeled using a distribution over the population.
For a given value of q, based on the form of the demand, the
fraction of users willing to pay at least p for the service, among
those who found the CP, equals 1− dp/D0 (assuming that all
users would subscribe if p = 0). Varying p, the distribution of
the willingness-to-pay among users is deduced to be uniform
on [0, D0/d], while D0 represents the total size of the user
population
A reasonable assumption, implicit in the product form of
the demand function, is that the search behavior of users is
independent of their willingness-to-pay for the service, i.e.,
the distribution of willingness-to-pay is independent of q.
Consequently, for given values of q and p we can simply
compute the (average) beneﬁt that users make by ﬁnding and
subscribing to the service offered by the CP, as the product of
D0 times β(q) times the average user beneﬁt from using the
service given its price p.
This gives, recalling that only users with willingness-to-pay
w > p will subscribe :
UW(p, q) = D0β(q)
∫ D0/d
w=0
d/D0[w − p]+dw
= β(q)d
∫ D0/d
w=p
(w − p)dw
= β(q)d
∫ D0/d−p
y=0
ydy
=
1
2
β(q)d (D0/d− p)2
=
1
2d
D2(p, q)
β(q)
,
where x+ = max(0, x).
The above expression is applicable to both the neutral and
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non-neutral cases, that is:
UW(n) = UW(p(n), 0) =
β0
8d
D20
UW(nn) = UW(p(nn), q∗) =
β∗
8d
(D0 − dq∗)2.
It is easy to check that
UW(nn) > UW(n) iff C4 ≡ D0
d
>
q∗
1−
√
β0
β∗
which happens to be the same condition as in (27), and thus
UW(nn) > UW(n) ⇔ Π(nn)c > Π(n)c
⇒ D(nn) > D(n) ⇒ Π(nn)SE > Π(n)SE . (30)
C. Discussion
Let us now illustrate the results we have just derived
analytically. Our goal is to discuss the inﬂuence that the
parameters have on the outcome for each stakeholder.
a) On the conditions C2, C3 and C4: In Fig. 2, the
domains such that conditions C2 and C3 hold are represented
as a function of λ.
First, note that the domain for C1 is not represented
because, as derived in (30), C4 ⇒ C1, and because the
user welfare is more appropriate than the user demand when
assessing whether the users are better off in neutral or non-
neutral situations. Second, C4 is not represented since it is
equivalent to C2. Third, the graph represents the right-hand
side of each inequality as a function of the parameter λ, and
each pair of curves is generated with a different value for the
parameter β0. And fourth, the represented range of λ complies
with (22).
Note that C2 = C4 is indeed the most constraining
condition (as proved previously), since the threshold curve
lies above that of C3 for every value of β0. Also the graph
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Fig. 3. Πc, ΠSE and UW for neutral and non-neutral cases (D0/d =
6, λ = 8)
demonstrates that there is a wide range of values for D0/d
and λ such that C3 holds but C2 = C4 does not, i.e., where
the SE is better off but both the CP and the users are harmed
with a non-neutral SE.
b) On the values of Πc, ΠSE and UW: In Fig. 3, the
values of Πc, ΠSE and UW are represented as a function of
β0. The values of the parameters are D0 = 30, d = 5 and
λ = 8.
As expected from the conditions C2, C3 and C4 and the
discussion of Fig. 2, for low values of β0, all stakeholders are
better off in the non-neutral case. As β0 increases, the ﬁrst
stakeholders to be harmed are the users and the CP, while the
SE remains as the only stakeholder to take proﬁt from the
search bias for high values of β0.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We conclude that under certain conditions, a side payment
by the content provider to the search engine is beneﬁcial for
all stakeholders, since:
• the users are better off, which means that the improve-
ment achieved by the increase in the likeliness to ﬁnd the
content compensates for the increase in the content price:
more users “see” the content, and despite the fact that the
price increases, the number of subscribers increases;
• the content provider beneﬁts from a better visibility,
allowing it to increase the subscription price to cover the
payments to the search engine;
• and the search engine beneﬁts from the increase in either
the demand or the side payment, or in both.
Note that this win-win situation depends on the characteristics
of the user demand, through the maximum tolerable price over
the population; on the quality of the search activity; and on
fraction of SE proﬁts that depends on the users demand but
is independent of the side payment. As we have seen, for this
situation to occur, it is required that:
• users be willing to pay a sufﬁcient amount for the service,
• without side payments, the SE gets a sufﬁcient revenue
out of user demand for content,
• the visibility of the content in the neutral situation is low
enough.
When this win-win situation is not achieved, the users and
the CPs are the ﬁrst stakeholders to suffer from non-neutral
search activity.
The above results support in this case the demand of the
search engine neutrality advocates, which claim that regulatory
measures should be put in place so as to avoid that search bias
results in the users being harmed.
We plan to extend the present work in order to tackle
more complex and realistic scenarios. Speciﬁcally, we intent
to extend the neutral and non-neutral model with two CPs, so
that the following situations may be evaluated: (1) competition
between the CPs; (2) collusion among the CPs; and (3)
integration between the SE and one CP (such as Youtube
owned by Google).
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